Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the September 11th 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, was killed on May 2nd by a US special forces raid on his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the September 11th 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, was killed on May 2nd by a US special forces raid on his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Although the al-Qaida leader's death is a major symbolic victory, he had long ago ended his involvement in day-to-day planning of terrorist attacks. This means that bin Laden's death is much more psychologically than operationally significant for the US-led global war on terrorism, and is unlikely to permanently magnify or reduce the security risks people and businesses face. The most concrete fallout from the episode may be the toll it takes on US-Pakistan relations, which were already suffering from serious strains. 

On one level, the killing of the founder of al-Qaida is a milestone and a cathartic moment in the US's prolonged war on terrorism. Bin Laden has been the world's most wanted man for nearly a decade, after orchestrating the 9/11 attacks that killed around 3,000 people from more than 70 countries. He was nearly killed or captured during the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, but then the trail went cold. As the years passed, the US's inability to locate and punish the al-Qaida leader fed a nagging sense of impotence that contributed to public disillusionment with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If one man could indefinitely evade and outwit the world's sole superpower, then what were the US's chances of prevailing in a broader war against terrorism as such? Bin Laden's demise may help to put such questions to rest, boosting morale for the US public, armed forces, intelligence agencies and political leadership after a very long run of mixed results.

Nevertheless, the killing of al-Qaida's founder will not mark a major turning point in the war against terrorism. Correctly assuming that electronic communications would betray his location, bin Laden has for years played little role, if any, in planning al-Qaida operations. Unless the computers seized by US special forces provide unexpectedly valuable information, bin Laden's death is unlikely to be a discernible blow to the terrorist organization’s already much-diminished capabilities.

Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that bin Laden's death will have no tangible effect on terrorist groups. Even after his withdrawal from day-to-day operations, the al-Qaida leader remained a powerful source of inspiration for some extremist groups. His death at the hands of US soldiers is a setback for those who saw his apparent invulnerability as proof of divine protection. However, his followers may be equally likely to think that his purported martyrdom only enhances his legacy. In the short term, there is an elevated risk of revenge attacks by groups allied with al-Qaida or supportive of its cause.

In broader terms, the death of al-Qaida's leader underscores the steady reversals the organisation has suffered in the past decade. Al-Qaida has been largely eradicated in Afghanistan, where the conflict is now primarily a domestic fight between the Taliban and the government and its NATO allies. Elsewhere, al-Qaida has fragmented into a loosely affiliated confederation of groups that share an extremist ideology but little operational overlap. Many of these groups have actively sought the al-Qaida founder's imprimatur, but his death will not impinge on their capabilities, which have been severely weakened by other forces over the past several years.

In particular, al-Qaida's brand of militant Islamism has suffered serious setbacks on the ideological front. Al-Qaida hoped to keep the US in a permanent quagmire in Iraq, but its indiscriminately violent tactics eventually alienated local tribal leaders, triggering the so-called "Sunni Awakening" that is credited with enabling the withdrawal of many US combat troops. The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 also improved the US's image in the Muslim world—at least compared with its nadir during the Bush years. Perhaps most importantly, the wave of revolutions now sweeping the Middle East and North Africa can be seen as a resounding rejection of al-Qaida's ideology. In the past few months, citizens in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere have taken real strides towards al-Qaida's ultimate goal of toppling the region's despots—but they have done so in the name of greater freedom and democracy. In essence, al-Qaida's own purported constituency appears to have rejected the extremist group's diagnosis of the region's problems, its tactics for combating them and its eschatological vision.

US-Pakistan tensions

In the light of these factors, the most important ramification of the events leading to bin Laden's death may be to exacerbate the tense US-Pakistan relationship. The Pakistani authorities initially reacted with calm, taking credit for their role in the intelligence-gathering efforts that eventually pinpointed bin Laden's location. However, the tone has changed as the government has come under domestic pressure to protest stridently against the US's violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

The US decision to mount a purportedly secret attack deep inside Pakistan lays bare the depth of the putative allies' mutual distrust. From Pakistan's perspective, the US's decision to carry out the mission without obtaining advance permission is yet another egregious violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. From the US side, however, this lack of trust seems warranted. Unlike previously thought, bin Laden had not spent the past several years in a remote cave in a lawless tribal area. Instead, he had been living in a large, well-appointed compound a mere stone's throw from Pakistan's premier military academy. Retired Pakistani intelligence officials have argued that at least some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services must have known he was there. Whether or not this is the case, the alternative is hardly more reassuring. Either the Pakistani authorities lied for years in insisting they were unaware of bin Laden's location, or they were breathtakingly inept for failing to notice his presence in their midst.

Although US-Pakistan relations may be entering an even more difficult phase, a full breakdown in relations remains very unlikely. The two sides remain mutually dependent. The US sees Pakistan's co-operation as necessary for any long-term military or political solution in Afghanistan, and an increasingly economically straitened Pakistan needs US military and financial aid. Official US statements regarding bin Laden's demise have specifically mentioned Pakistani co-operation, suggesting that the US is keen to see relations carry on much as before.

In the days ahead, both sides are likely to come under intense domestic pressure to act tough. In the US, perceptions of Pakistan's reliability as an ally will suffer more damage, potentially leading to the curtailment of US aid to Pakistan and further undermining popular support for the war in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the episode poses political problems for the government whether it knew of the raid and sanctioned it or not. If the government takes partial credit for the US action, it will be criticised for allowing the US to conduct unilateral military operations deep with Pakistan. But if the government publicly disavows the raid, this will highlight its intelligence failures and/or its complicity with bin Laden.